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Herlina Bintoro, a native and citizen of Indonesia, entered the United States as a 




                                                                         
her with removability.  Bintoro conceded the charge and sought withholding of removal 
based on her experiences as an ethnically Chinese Catholic in Indonesia.
1
  The 
Immigration Judge (AIJ@) denied her application; the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(ABIA@) dismissed Bintoro=s appeal.2  Bintoro filed a petition for review.  She 
subsequently filed a motion to reopen.  After the BIA denied the motion, she filed 
another petition for review.  Her cases have been consolidated for disposition.   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. ' 1252(a).  Questions of law are 
reviewed de novo, see Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 302 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001), while 
factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, see Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 
430, 433 (3d Cir. 2005).  Review of the BIA=s decision to deny the motion to reopen is 
under a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F. 3d 
556, 562 ( 3d Cir. 2004).  The discretionary decision is not disturbed unless it is found 
to be arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.  See id. 
                                                 
1     Initially, Bintoro also sought asylum and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture, but she withdrew those applications at her hearing.   
2     As the parties are familiar with the procedural history of the case, we gloss 
over its exact details.  However, although we do not describe the problem with 
the transcription, we note that it was resolved with the stipulation of the parties 
and the IJ=s consideration of additional updates and reissuance of his decision.   
On appeal, Bintoro argues that the BIA erred by failing to apply the correct 
standard in reaching the conclusion that she did not suffer past persecution; by acting 
as a fact-finder; and by concluding that she had not demonstrated that it is more likely 
than not that she would be singled out for persecution or that there is a pattern or 





motion to reopen was an abuse of discretion based on errors of fact and law.  The 
Government counters that Bintoro did not exhaust the issue of past persecution before 
the BIA and that the BIA did not consider the issue sufficiently such that we would have 
jurisdiction over the issue.  The Government alternatively argues that Bintoro did not 
prove past persecution.  The Government also contends that Bintoro did not show a 
probability of future persecution and disputes that the BIA acted as a fact-finder or 
erred in denying the motion to reopen. 
At her hearing, Bintoro conceded that she had not suffered past persecution, and 
the IJ made note of the concession.  In light of the concession, and because of his 
Aindependent analysis@ of the issue, the IJ determined that Bintoro had not shown past 
persecution.  The BIA Aagree[d] with the [IJ] that the past harm [Bintoro] suffered in 
Indonesia does not rise to the level of persecution,@ and cited cases (with parenthetical 
explanations) to support its conclusion.  Because the BIA considered the issue of past 
persecution, we have jurisdiction over it.  See Bin Lin v. Attorney Gen. of the United 
States, 543 F.3d 114, 123-24 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating, among other things, that 
Athe BIA=s consideration of an issue is sufficient to provide us with jurisdiction over that 
issue@). 
We disagree with Bintoro=s claim that the BIA failed to apply the correct standard 
in considering the issue of past persecution.  In ruling, the BIA applied, among other 
things, one of our cases (Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F. 3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005)) that set forth the 




                                                                         
Bintoro had not shown past persecution based on claims of discrimination and 
harassment and once being accosted by a knife-wielding Indonesian man in 1977 
follows from an application of Lie (as well as our other precedent).  See Lie, 396 F.3d 
at 536-37 (holding that Atwo isolated criminal acts, perpetrated by unknown assailants, . 
. . [are] not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution@); see also Jarbough v. 
Attorney Gen. of the United States, 483 F. 3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007) (AAbusive 
treatment and harassment, while always deplorable, may not rise to the level of 
persecution.@); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F. 3d 221, 233 n.20 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that 
courts routinely deny immigration relief to persons Awho suffer racial discrimination that 
falls short of persecution.@).   
We also hold that the BIA did not err in concluding that Bintoro had not 
demonstrated that it is more likely than not that she would be singled out for 
persecution or that there is a pattern or practice of persecution in Indonesia.  Cf. Wong 
v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 539 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2008); Lie, 396 F.3d 
at 537-38; Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006). Also, there 
is no evidence in the record that the BIA improperly found facts in coming to this or its 
other conclusions.   
Lastly, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bintoro=s 
motion to reopen.  The BIA rejected the statement supplied by Bintoro=s husband in 
support of her motion on the basis that his description of the incident was inconsistent 





the facts in the record or the law, see Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 
2007) (holding that Aa single false document or a single instance of false testimony may 
(if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the alien=s uncorroborated or 
unauthenticated evidence@).  Besides, as the BIA concluded, Bintoro=s other evidence 
was cumulative of information already in the record.        
For these reasons, we will deny the petitions for review.   
